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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the risk of bankruptcy of an Italian manufacturing firms data set from the Marche region that 
has the greater share of persons employed in industry as a proportion of those employed in the non-financial 
business economy in the country. This evidence is more important if we consider that in Europe only 17% of 
regions reaches more than 40% of its employed in industry. Moreover, the considered firms are excellent in 
terms of their size in relation to turnover and employment and are representative examples of what in Italy is 
known as “fourth capitalism”. Alternative default probability predictive methods have been tested on the 
accounting data from these statistical units. Specifically, after testing the adequacy of Altman’s Z-score model, 
we attempt to solve its well known limit due to the consideration of the same number of defaulting and non-
defaulting firms in the sample, up till the selection of new explicative variables related to enterprise’s bankruptcy 
risk and an alternative fixed effects panel data approach to estimate the model parameters. So, we progressively 
obtain a considerable improvement in the overall forecasting error. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The composite nature of the Great Recession which 
is now underway has created space for a great 
variety of interpretations and analyses of the issue. 
Developing in the United States as financial 
turbulence, way back on 8th August 2007, it then 
changed to become a financial crisis which was, first 
of all, full-blown and then systemic becoming a 
hitherto-unknown real crisis. Throughout its course, 
much has been written, repeatedly, about the 
different components which make up the credit 
industry, with different levels of relevance and 
different emphases. 
The vulnerability of the various countries which 
were exposed to real, financial and credit 
transmission mechanisms in the great recession, is 
closely correlated to the specific situation of each of 
them. On one hand, the comparative fragility of the 
various banking and financial systems, the support 
lines which had been set up and the mechanisms and 
the extent to which they were employed have had a 
different impact on the real economy. On the other 
hand, the different levels of industrialization of 
countries, the specific weight of the manufacturing 
sector, their morphology in terms of manufacturing 
sector activity and the size of enterprises, their 
greater or lesser dependence on external sources of 
finance are at the basis of the greater or lesser 
resilience of industrial systems. 
The Italian economy has had to face relatively 
fewer difficulties than its European partners and 
international competitors in terms of the stability of 
its financial infrastructure1. In contrast, it has seen a 
greater fall in production and gross national product 
than the other industrialized countries2. 
Recession, depression and crisis are 
macroeconomic categories. Corresponding to them 
at the level of the system of production of goods and 
services, in macro-sectors and within them in 
branches of economic activity, are destruction of 
technical and immaterial capital assets as well as that 
of working capital of production units which comes 
about when businesses fail. The empirical evidence 
shows that, from this point of view, the Italian 
economy is subject to a worrying sequence in the 
number of bankruptcies. The variations in 
percentage terms of defaulting firms rose constantly 
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1 Ricerche & Studi (2010). 
2 Banca d’Italia (2010). 
Open Journal of Economic Research 16
Mauro Marconi, Anna Grazia Quaranta, Silvana Tartufoli 
EVALUATING THE RISK OF INSOLVENCY♦ 
 
2 
 
from the third quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 
2010 and it rose by double figures3. 
Assessing the risk of bankruptcy is certainly a 
central issue for economic and financial analysis but, 
despite that, no mainstream for it yet exists. 
Institutional factors peculiar to each country and a 
large variety of causes which can lead to the failure 
of an enterprise, in fact, obstruct the route to a theory 
which can be generally applied. Despite this, it is an 
issue which must be faced, not only because it is 
central to credit management by banking operators, 
but also, after all, for its overall impact on economy. 
Talking about bankruptcy risk entails talking about 
the Z-score model. Following Altman implies 
contextualizing analysis to a data set of information 
and to its construction which must take account of 
institutional rules. 
Below, we have highlighted the difficulties which 
can be expected from discriminant analysis in terms 
of prediction and the necessity to improve and go 
beyond it. The technique of estimating bankruptcy 
risk probability proposed, fixed effect panel analysis, 
allows us to solve some of the inherent problems 
with discriminant analysis and to obtain statistically 
better results (Section 2). 
We referred to a closed set of enterprises from the 
Marche region of Italy, selected in 1998. These 
enterprises can be traced back by size and 
importance to those which in Italy make up “fourth 
capitalism”4 (Section 3). 
The results of the methodologies applied to the data 
set are presented in Section 4 together with a 
sensitivity analysis; Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Cerved Group (2010). 
4 Colli (2002). 
A PROPOSAL  FOR  ASSESSING THE 
PROBABILITY  OF  BANKRUPTCY 
 
This work takes as its starting point the first model 
put forward by Altman in 1968, since this is the 
point of reference for most credit risk models before 
moving on to some variations on it. 
 
Altman’s Model 
 
Applying a multivariate discriminant analysis to 
estimate the coefficients of explanatory variables, 
Altman tried to predict the probability of bankruptcy 
using five specifically selected balance sheet 
indicators5 which describe the financial and 
economic system of a firm (liquidity, asset solidity, 
profitability, financial structure and productivity). 
The Z-score is defined as follows: 
 
Z = 0,012 x1 + 0,014 x2 + 0,033 x3 + 0,0006 x4 + 
0.999 x5 
 
where: 
x1 = Working Capital / Total Assets; 
x2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets; 
x3 = EBIT / Total Assets; 
x4 = Market Value of Equity / Book Value of Total 
Debt; 
x5 = Sales / Total Assets. 
  
If  
Z  1.8 the probability of bankruptcy is extremely 
high; 
1.8 < Z  2.7 it is quite likely that the firm will 
become bankrupt; 
                                                 
5 In detail, after compiling a list of 22 potential explanatory variables 
classified into five standard categories, he opted for the following 
procedure in order to select the five final independent variables: 
1. observing the statistical significance of various alternative 
functions (F test) including the determination of the relative 
contribution of each independent variable (t test); 
2. evaluating the level of correlation between the explanatory 
variables; 
3. observing the accuracy of the various profiles; 
4. considering analysts’ judgements as subjective data. 
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2.7< Z  3 some caution is needed, but it is unlikely 
that the firm will become bankrupt; 
Z > 3 the firm is unlikely to default. 
The Z-score coefficients, along with the ranges 
quoted above, were calculated on the basis of a 
sample of 66 manufacturing corporations. The firms 
were divided into two groups of 33. The first group 
was made up of firms which had filed for 
bankruptcy in the years between 1946 and 1965, 
spread relatively uniformly over the twenty-year 
period; the data referred to the financial period 
immediately prior to bankruptcy. The second group 
was made up of non-bankrupt manufacturing firms 
which were randomly selected from the Moody’s list 
and other sources and stratified both by sector and 
size6. The data relating to the firms in this second list 
were taken from the same years as those in the first 
group. 
Using an F-test, Altman concluded that, for 
classification purposes, the most relevant variables 
are x3 (profitability index), x5 (productivity index) 
and x4 (financial structure index), while x1 (liquidity 
index) is the least relevant. 
The model proved extremely accurate when it was 
tested on a sample of firms different from those used 
to estimate the parameters for the year immediately 
prior to failure; type I error (failure of a firm when 
bankruptcy was not predicted), the most dangerous, 
and type II error (firms which had been expected to 
go bankrupt which did, in fact, not) were both 
modest. 
Naturally, the effectiveness of the model in 
classifying enterprises is reduces gradually as we go 
back in time. 
Altman later suggested using the same model for 
privately held firms by modifying the x4 variable that 
becomes Net Worth / Total Debt7. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Small and very large enterprises were excluded from the sample of 
healthy firms for the purposes of homogeneity with respect to the size 
of the corporations in the first group. 
7 Altman (1993). 
Potential and limitations of altman’s model and 
alternative solutions 
 
In Altman’s initial work, and in the later analyses it 
inspired, equal subsample group sizes (50-50) were 
used; this choice was dictated by a number of factors 
including the need to reduce variance in coefficient 
estimation, the need to identify the differences 
between groups more efficiently and the desire to 
contain the costs of selecting the firms whose data is 
to be used in the model. 
This balance between non-defaulting and defaulting 
firms is evidently in opposition to the concept of 
random sampling, since it can only be based on ex 
post knowledge of some characteristics of the firm 
meaning that the predictive capacity of the model is 
conditioned in an ex ante decision-making context. 
In theory, the numerosity of the subsets should, in 
fact, reflect the non-defaulting/defaulting 
composition of the population; this is the only way 
in which the estimated model can be applied directly 
to the real context with probability which coincides 
a priori with the sample without having to make 
further adjustments. 
One peculiarity of Altman’s model is that it 
considers the parameters estimated by the 
discriminant function valid, and therefore constant, 
for long periods of time. This aspect is, in reality, 
closely connected to the ex ante and ex post 
predictive capacity of a model and, although 
maintenance of the diagnostic capability over time is 
doubtless based on the stability of the relationships 
observed between the explanatory variables and 
bankruptcy, it is also the case that it is necessary to 
verify a model’s performance periodically and 
perhaps go on to re-estimate the parameters when 
the discriminant analysis effectiveness tends to be 
reduced as, moreover, national banks suggest. 
The selection of explanatory variables in Altman’s 
model is the result of a purely empirical research 
process with adaptations which are often dependent 
on individual choices and consistent with the basic 
absence of a solid firm bankruptcy or crisis theory. 
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The problem has therefore been raised of testing 
whether it is still worth using the same variables in a 
different space-time context or, rather, whether they 
are still really able to classify this type of enterprise 
efficiently, minimizing the type I and type II errors. 
One of the most hotly-contested issues in the 
scientific debate since the publication of Altman’s 
research has been what choice of statistical method 
to make when designing models for bankruptcy risk 
prediction. Let us, therefore, consider a brief 
overview of the potentialities and limits of using the 
most widespread methodologies in order to arrive at 
a new proposal relative to the case in point. 
Discriminant analysis aims at seeking out the 
optimum combination of indicators which can best 
separate two sets; in particular, in our context of 
analysis, such a methodology implicitly assumes that 
the observable firms come from two given distinct 
universes and that detecting variables in the balance 
sheet can help find features which are relevant to 
finding the actual universe to which each enterprise 
belongs. In looking for a single signal which would 
allow us to consign the statistical unit to one of two 
groups a priori, each indicator, considered more as a 
signal of status than a quantitative proxy of the real 
economic and financial situation of the firm, is 
necessary in virtue of the contribution it makes to 
the overall signal. This methodology is, in essence, 
based on the assumptions that the indicator 
distribution is of a multivariate normal type, that the 
averages of the balance sheet indices of the two 
groups are significatively different and on the 
equality of the variance-covariance matrix of the two 
groups. 
As far as the first assumption is concerned, it is a 
well-known fact that indicator distribution is not of 
normal type and that, in any case, it is not certain 
that their conjoint would be the same. Given that this 
circumstance has an inevitable influence on the test 
of significativity and on the performance level of the 
models, some researchers have proceeded to 
transform the original variables8, if only to make the 
distributions more symmetrical. In doing this, they 
have run into further problems involving change in 
the relationships between the explanatory variables 
and consequent difficulties in interpreting the 
functions obtained as well as in alterations in the 
coefficient estimates. Actually, the problem of non-
normality in the indicator distribution could be 
overcome since numerous experiments have shown 
that the effects of violating normality in discriminant 
analysis (both linear and quadratic) in this particular 
context would generally be less dramatic than 
statistical theory tends to suggest (Altman et al., 
1981).  
If dispersion between the groups differs, meaning 
the fall of the last of the above-quoted assumptions 
on which the discriminant analysis is based, the tests 
on the differences between the medians of the 
groups9 would inevitably be influenced and it would 
seem preferable to turn to a quadratic discriminant 
function even though this, as empirical evidence 
teaches us, would not be more systematically 
relevant10 or efficient than a linear discriminant 
function. The latter has proved globally better than 
the former (Altman et al., 1977). The empirical 
evidence also shows that a quadratic discriminant 
function, that must inevitably take account of the 
interactions among the variables and of the quadratic 
terms, is in any case characterized by a high number 
of coefficients which are, amongst other things, 
often difficult to interpret. In other words, although 
the starting point is a model designed on the basis of 
a limited number of explanatory variables, within a 
                                                 
8 Where possible (only for positive values of the indicators) the 
logarithmic operator or the square root has often been used; 
sometimes, however, the reciprocal of the values or the transformation 
of the original values into classes is used.  
9 This problem is specific to the approach with discriminant analysis, 
which is based on the assumption that there are two distinct 
populations and it does not apply to linear or logistic multiple 
regression, which are based on the assumption of a single population. 
10 It would actually seem (Eisenbeis, 1997) that the elements which 
could influence the final outcome would be due to the effective entity 
of the difference between the variance-covariance matrices, to the 
number of elements which make up the samples and the number and 
type of the balance sheet indicators used. 
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quadratic structure many coefficients would be 
generated and so it would be difficult to understand 
from an economics and financial point of view if 
they would be associated with a sign which would 
not be coherent with theoretical expectations. 
Although the economic plausibility of the coefficient 
signs and, as a result, the right direction for the cause 
and effect relationship is undoubtedly a basic 
condition for acceptance of any model, the modest 
improvements obtained by using quadratic functions 
which tend to go hand in hand with probable sign 
errors in a significative number of coefficients can 
only lead to the model being rejected from an 
economics point of view. In addition, the 
coefficients of the same variables estimated using a 
linear function would, in contrast, maintain the 
correct signs and would thus explain why it is the 
preferred type of function in many applications 
(Varetto, 1999). 
A further difficulty, by no means easy to solve, 
which is encountered when implementing a 
bankruptcy prediction model based on discriminant 
analysis concerns evaluation of the relative 
importance of the function variables, or rather their 
individual discriminatory capacity; in this context, in 
fact, the coefficients are non-unique, as only the 
ratios between them is so, making it applying tests to 
check out alternative assumptions pointless. 
To conclude this brief overview of discriminant 
analysis and the different ways it can be used when 
defining a bankruptcy prediction model, it would be 
interesting to note that other empirical studies 
(Eisenbeis, 1997) have highlighted how linear 
analysis has shown itself robust to the violation of 
the methodological assumptions only when large-
scale samples are used. 
Multiple regression has also been used in some 
research on credit risk: in our research context, the 
approach mainly consists in estimating a model in 
which the dependent variable is a qualitative 
dichotomic (which describes belonging to the set of 
non-defaulting or defaulting firms) or a probability 
of default, while the balance sheet indicators are the 
explanatory variables11. It therefore seems clear 
how, with this type of model, the degree of the 
firm’s economic and financial difficulty has to be 
estimated: in a multiple linear regression aimed at 
defining a model for the evaluation of credit risk the 
assumption is in fact that firms are randomly 
extracted from a single universe and an attempt is 
made to estimate their level of health (or the linear 
probability of insolvency/bankruptcy); the state of 
health can therefore be considered a characteristic 
expressed through a continuous latent variable which 
has only two observable essential extreme 
determinations (zero and one). It follows that this 
type of model makes the basic assumption that there 
is a causal relationship between the variables 
observed on accounting data and the dependent 
variable, implicitly supposing that there is a cause 
and effect relationship between the economic 
phenomena distilled from the balance sheet variables 
and the firm’s state of health. It can be shown 
(Maddala, 1983 and 1992) that multiple regression 
has a close relationship with discriminant analysis: 
linear discriminant function coefficients are in fact 
equal to those from an OLS regression, linear in 
type, unless a constant relationship. 
Use of multiple regression is not without its critics. 
Some difficulties exist, although they are not, in 
reality, insurmountable. A first problem is, in actual 
fact, connected to heteroscedasticity, while the 
second difficulty regards the fact that estimating the 
independent variable often does not determine 
values equal to or included between zero and one, as 
it would be logical to obtain in order to interpret the 
results in terms of non-defaulting or defaulting 
enterprises or, in the case of linear probability 
models, in terms of the probability of being, more or 
less, in a state of distress. 
The former problem is easily removed by using, 
alternatively, a two-stage estimation procedure, 
                                                 
11 In this context, the balance sheet indicators are therefore the 
exogenous variables which are able to explain the real economic and 
financial situation of the enterprise, its evolution and any deterioration 
leading to a state of crisis. 
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despite the fact that this would be unable to solve 
other issues such as, for example, the absence of 
error normality, or rather, as we shall suggest, by 
means of linear panel regression. Obtaining 
monotonically dependent variable values within the 
zero-one interval could also be achieved by using a 
logistics model (logit)12 or, much more easily, as we 
shall see in our implementation, by normalizing the 
balance indicators. 
As concerns the use of a logit model to obtain 
dependent variable values which are monotonically 
within the zero-one interval, it must be borne in 
mind that the assumption about the shape of the 
distribution of bankruptcy probability is actually 
very strong and could heavily influence the results 
obtained from its implementation. A further relevant 
problem which would be encountered by using a 
logistic model concerns the perception of changes in 
probability given that the morphology of the 
function itself ensures that there are very different 
variations along the various sections of the curve13 in 
contrast with what happens in a linear relationship 
where the slope is known to be constant. A further 
factor which could lead to a decision not to opt for a 
                                                 
12 The key idea of a logit model is that it supposes that there is a 
relationship between the probability of the firm becoming bankrupt 
(non-observable variable) and a set of observable signals which are 
closely connected to bankruptcy; that which can actually be observed 
is only a dichotomic realization of the probability of bankruptcy. In 
reality, the logit model is not the only one which is able to produce 
values in the zero-one interval, but some mathematical properties 
make it preferable as is more easily tractable and, therefore, more 
suitable for application. A very similar model to logit which is 
implemented in credit risk analysis is probit model; this is based on 
the key assumption regarding the shape of the cumulative distribution 
of bankruptcy probability which, instead of being cumulative logistic 
is assumed to be cumulative standardized normal. Despite the 
cumulative distribution shapes being different, the results provided by 
the logit and probit approaches in applications inherent to defining 
models for credit risk analysis are extremely similar; undoubtedly, 
however, normal distribution presents greater difficulties in terms of 
mathematical tractability than logistical which is therefore preferable 
for the purposes of implementations. 
13 In detail, movements along parts of the function near to the 
horizontal asymptotes generate perceptions of changes which are very 
limited in probability even when alterations in the firm’s situation are 
major; in the central area (oblique) of the logistic function, however, 
relatively small changes in the firm’s situation translate into relevant 
variations in probability. 
logistic multiple regression lies in the fact that 
logistic regression generally produces results which 
are not very different from those obtained by the 
more tried-and-tested linear discriminant analysis14. 
In the light of the above, in order to solve the 
problem of dependent variable values of a multiple 
linear regression outside the zero-one interval, it 
would seem much more immediate and effective to 
turn to normalization of the balance sheet indicator 
values with respect to the opportune maximum 
values, without the need for strong basic 
assumptions and without creating any problems in 
interpretation of the changes in probability. 
In relation to the evaluation of the relative 
importance of the function explanatory variables in 
linear or logistic multiple regressions, in contrast 
with what happens, as we have seen, when 
discriminant analysis is applied, the problem could 
be easily resolved by the well-known parametrical 
statistical tests15. 
The normality of the indicators’ distributions is an 
assumption which is relevant not only, as stated 
above, to discriminant analysis, but also to linear 
parametric techniques; this circumstance, we would 
like to restate, generally influences both tests of 
significativity and the performance of the models. 
However, just as in the case of discriminant analysis, 
empirical evidence has shown that the effects of the 
violation of normality on linear and logistical 
multiple regression are not generally as consistent as 
statistical theory tends to underline (Altman et al., 
1981). 
Over time, the literature has been broadened with 
numerous studies aimed at looking deeper into the 
various methodological aspects and different 
approaches as well as experimenting with new 
                                                 
14 See Bardos and Zhu (1998). 
15 The literature on the subject includes various methods which have 
been suggested for assessing the importance of explanatory variables. 
In particular, we remind the reader to the approach which, bearing in 
mind existing relationships which have been described between linear 
discriminant analysis and regression of the same type, after setting up 
a model with the former methodology proceeds to a new estimation of 
the explanatory variable coefficients with the second, with the one aim 
of assessing the individual efficiency of the variables. 
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techniques which have often come from the field of 
artificial intelligence16. Discriminant analysis and 
multiple regressions continue, however, to be of 
great interest to those operating in banking who, in 
the light of new opportunities offered by the rules, 
are continually in search of new methods to 
supplement traditional procedures in credit 
selection17.  
There have recently been a number of contributions 
where the classification into the subsets  non-
defaulting and defaulting firms is obtained by 
employing a number of approaches at the same time 
(mainly linear discriminant analysis and logistic 
multiple regression) and then choosing the model 
with the best performance out of the sample, testing, 
by this way, non sample-specific results derived by 
an overfitting and the consequent inability of the 
model to provide generalizations. 
In the light of what has been said concerning the 
choice of statistical method to adopt when setting up 
predictive models and bearing in mind the 
availability of space-time data, in our empirical 
analysis we have decided to use two methods 
together: firstly, linear discriminant analysis, a 
paragon which cannot be substituted since it is still 
the most implemented worldwide and because of the 
legacy which has stemmed from the first model put 
forward by Altman; the second method is a panel 
fixed effects linear regression. In using this new 
methodology, an attempt has been made (i) 
progressively to enucleate the factors which can 
influence the critical aspects of business 
management most likely to be more correlated to 
probability of default and  (ii) to analyze and test the 
coherence of the empirical evidence with theoretical 
                                                 
16 See Altman, et al. (1994), Carrara and Cavalli (1996), Baetge and 
Uthoff (1998), Piramuthu (1998) and Quaranta (2008 and 2009). 
17 The same Regulatory Bodies have directed increasing attention to 
methodologies in order to obtain a more efficient and effective credit 
selection; to this end, it would seem interesting to note the 
contributions of Laviola and Trapanese (1997) and di Marullo Reedtz 
et al. (1996). The European Committee of Central Balance-Sheet Data 
Offices has compared the different experiences which have come from 
using discriminant analysis for the purposes of bankruptcy risk 
diagnosis in the main European countries. 
expectations in relation to causal direction 
(parameter’s sign) of every explanatory variable held 
to be econometrically significative, at the same time 
as solving the widely-debated problem of 
heteroscedasticity in multiple linear regression and, 
as we shall see in detail below (Section 4.4), 
avoiding obtaining values of the dependent variable 
which are outside the zero-one interval by means of 
an opportune normalization of the values assumed 
by the balance sheet indicators in space and time. 
Panel data, as is widely known, are characterized by 
a greater wealth of information both with respect to 
historical series and to cross-sectional data and, 
wherever they are available, they are to be preferred 
also because the information which is supplied from 
the temporal dimension is able to contain to a great 
extent, if not eliminate completely, the problems of 
heteroscedasticity which occur in multiple 
regression. 
In contrast with the analyses carried out exclusively 
in a spatial dimension, temporal data (within or 
intra-individuals) are in fact considered. They permit 
an answer to the question (considering the 
characteristics of the firm as given) of whether 
institutional events or policy changes can have a 
certain effect on the relationship being analyzed over 
time. On another front, in contrast with analyses 
which are purely based on time series, data panels 
also consider information grasped by each individual 
(between or inter-individuals) which, in our context 
of analysis, (considering as given institutional events 
or changes in policy over time) allow us to answer 
the question about whether the specific 
characteristics of the considered firms can have an 
effect on the relationship being analyzed. 
With a panel data, therefore, more complex 
assumptions can be investigated (concerning 
dynamics, but also micro and macroeconomic 
characteristics). The high number of observations 
(from N or T to N*T) also permits both a better 
estimate of parameters and a more appropriate use of 
asymptotic statistical properties18. 
                                                 
18 In further detail:  
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This wealth of information to use more than one 
estimation strategy, in such a way that the 
parameters in object can be identified using the 
variability of data in a time dimension, cross-
sectionally or both. 
 
 
REFERENCE DATA 
In Italy, the only one region having more than 40% 
of persons employed in industry as a proportion of 
those employed in the non-financial business 
economy is Marche; this evidence is more important 
if we consider that in Europe only 17% of regions 
reaches more than share (Eurostat, 2009). 
The economy in the Marche region of Italy is 
characterized by widespread entrepreneurialism, 
quantifiable in terms of one enterprise for every 10 
inhabitants of the region. 
15% of firms operate in the manufacturing sector, 
providing employment for 27% of the working 
population, while contributing 26% of the regional 
added value. Firms mainly operate in the so-called 
traditional sectors and are mainly small (87% have 
fewer than 10 employees). Large enterprises19 
represent only 0.1%, whilst medium-sized are 1.3% 
of the total. In employment terms, the medium-large 
enterprises represent 29% and this alone could be 
enough to give those companies an importance to the 
area in which they operate which is greater than it 
seems in purely numerical terms. When local 
                                                                                      
(i)  reduced problems of collinearity, as a result of wider 
individual variability, make it possible to obtain more efficient 
estimates and a considerable improvement in the capacity to 
discriminate between different assumptions (tests);  
(ii) the introduction of non-observed effects makes it possible to 
obtain specific individual/temporal heterogeneity  and reduces 
the problems connected to aggregation; distortion due to 
omitting individual or temporal explanatory variables 
(correlated with the explanatory variables included) can be 
reduced;  
(iii) finally, individual heterogeneity can explain serial correlation 
and general serial dependence in the composite error term of 
and it can also discriminate between time-invariant and state 
dependent heterogeneity. 
19 The number of employees is used as dimensional variable. We take 
medium-sized enterprises to mean those with between 50 and 499 
employees; large enterprises are those with 500 or more employees. 
businesses with more than 20 employees are added, 
the employment share they cover reaches 46%, 
almost half the entire manufacturing segment. 
Their relevance in terms of employment is not the 
only reason why we have chosen to select some of 
these firms. There are some of firms among them 
which are benchmarks in the sector certainly for 
size, in terms of both number of employees and 
turnover, but also for innovative strategies and 
quality in production. Therefore, these firms can be 
also considered representative examples of what in 
Italy has become known as “fourth capitalism”20. 
Our data cover a time period from 1994 to 2008. In 
particular, we start from a closed set of 156 
manufacturing firms in 1994 that has progressively 
reduced to become 125 in 2008 because of 
bankruptcy; all the enterprises are capital firms not 
quoted on the stock exchange21 and derive from a 
series of stratifications which consider, on one hand, 
the size of the enterprise on the basis of turnover 
and, on the other, specialization in the sector and 
presence in the territory.  
The unusual nature of this set of companies makes it 
particularly suitable for our ends since it provides 
economic and financial information about a 
consistent number of enterprises over the course of 
fifteen years and contains almost all medium-large 
sized enterprises from the Marche that, if 
numerically represent a small share of the total firms 
in the manufactory sector, actually have a very 
relevant weight in economical aggregated terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Turani (1996), Colli (2002). “Fourth capitalism” groups together 
medium and large enterprises with a turnover of less than 3 billion 
Euros; anyway, these are conventional limits with no absolute value. 
21 This choice because in the Marche region the number of the quoted 
on the stock exchange firms is very exiguous. 
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STAGES IN ANALYSIS AND 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Implementing the Altman model: “50-50 sample” 
 
Analysis begins with the first model suggested by 
Altman in 1968, reference point for most credit risk 
models. 
First of all, the group of firms was subdivided into 
non-defaulting and defaulting companies. 
Enterprises which have failed judicially22 most 
certainly come into the second group. It is, however, 
necessary to remember that it is normal practice for 
firms to make considerable effort to escape 
bankruptcy between the beginning of irreversible 
economic and financial crisis and true bankruptcy or 
receivership. This can take some years, and the firm 
may cease trading or reduce its production 
drastically in order to liquidate some of its goods 
such as property. The firm might also sell or lease all 
or part of its production processes (plant, machinery, 
contracts and workforce). Using data from the 
balance sheet relating to the year before declaration 
of bankruptcy, highly anomalous data for an 
enterprise, would therefore lead to a model which 
discriminates firms at risk as being only those which 
are already in a state of crisis. This result would be 
of absolutely no use to financial intermediaries who 
are well able to recognize this level of crisis simply 
by reading the balance sheet. On the contrary, it is 
necessary to recognize the signals of economic and 
financial distress in enterprises which are operating 
normally. For this reason, the decision was taken to 
consider, not the last balance sheet before failure, 
but that relating to the final year of these firms’ 
normal operations. The decision was also made to 
widen the definition of defaulting enterprises to 
include those which were in voluntary liquidation. 
As far as the non-defaulting enterprises are 
concerned, some authors have raised the issue of 
                                                 
22 In the sense of setting an official procedure in motion: declaration 
of bankruptcy, receivership, temporary receivership or preventive 
administration. 
possible exclusion from this group of “vulnerable” 
firms, i.e. enterprises in good health but with 
elements of marked financial or economic 
weakness23 in order to allow better application of 
discriminant analysis. This exclusion would, 
however, lead to an inappropriate model which 
would be of little use as it would raise doubts about 
the rather common situation of firms which find 
themselves in temporary difficulty. In addition, 
procedural problems would present themselves 
because of a pre-selection that uses at the beginning 
of the procedure some appropriate variables chosen 
and therefore which could not be used later in the 
actual implemented discriminant analysis. In case in 
object, the decision was made to consider all 
companies which did not enter into the above 
definition of defaulting as being non-defaulting. 
Once the two groups were defined, following the 
procedure described by Altman, a sample made up 
of all the defaulting enterprises (31 firms) and the 
same number of non-defaulting enterprises was set 
up (a “50-50 sample”). 
For defaulting firms, as already specified, the 
balance sheet data relative to the final year of normal 
operation were considered, while in order to select 
the non-defaulting firms, for each failed enterprise 
was randomly chosen a healthy firm in the same 
sector, in the same year, and of similar size, 
considering as a proxy of the latter firstly the total 
assets and then the turnover. 
The information in this data set, as there were no 
situations of criticity before 1999, refers to the years 
1999-2007; on this basis, we moved on to 
constructing the five explanatory indicators of the 
probability of default suggested by Altman in 
relation to each firm in the “50-50 sample”. 
As it was necessary to implement a multivariate 
discriminant analysis, considering the numerosity of 
the two subsamples, defaulting and non-defaulting 
enterprises, after conducting some preliminary 
sensitivity analyses into the significativity of the 
                                                 
23 Peel and Peel (1987), Gilbert et al. (1990), Johnsen and Melicher 
(1994). 
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model solution, the decision was made to calibrate 
the width of the training set to 70%, for a total of 42 
enterprises, and the test set to 30%, for a total of 20 
units, in both cases equally divided into healthy and 
failed as the context was that of a “50-50 sample”. 
The prediction error obtained by this procedure was 
considerable being 40% overall (40% type I error 
and 40% type II error), therefore not modest as on 
the contrary emerged in Altman’s implementations 
and moreover worrying especially in terms of the 
high incidence of failing to pinpoint defaulting 
firms. 
 
 
Table 1. Test set classification 
results: “50-50 sample” 
 
 Predicted Group  
Actual Group non-
defaulting 
defaulting Total 
non-defaulting 6 4 10 
defaulting 4 6 10 
non-defaulting 60.0 40.0 100.0 
defaulting 40.0 60.0 100.0 
Overall classification error: 40% 
 
Information from 2008 on the actual state of health 
of the enterprises belonging to this sample, therefore 
confirm that this procedure is of little use in 
pinpointing firms in difficulty ex ante. 
 
 
Implementing Altman’s model: “80-20 sample” 
 
We considered whether the choice of a “50-50 
sample” might be behind the previous disappointing 
results, as many authors have already reported24. 
Really, in fact, in a normal economic context, it is 
difficult to find the same number of companies 
which are non-defaulting and defaulting, since there 
are more of the former than the latter; this topic, 
however, appears also within our set, since an 80-20 
                                                 
24 Among others, Varetto (1999). 
distribution between non-defaulting and defaulting 
firms results. 
In addition, prediction parameters calibrated to a 
“50-50 sample” should, as did not happen in the 
above application, in any case lead to a lower 
probability of type I error and, if anything, to a 
greater II type error guaranteeing, in this way, 
greater caution when evaluating credit risk. This 
topic does not emerge from the previous results too. 
Therefore, with the aim to not exclude any of the 
failed firms given the basic importance of their 
quantitative information, as we decided in relation to 
“50-50 sample”, considering the actual distribution 
between non-defaulting and defaulting firms in our 
data set, we chose to use it entirely; from the original 
panel data for each statistical unit we utilized the 
balance sheet of a single year, reaching in this way 
an “information sample”. Specifically, we 
considered all the 31 defaulting firms (now 
corresponding to 20%) for which we chose once 
again the quantitative information referring to the 
last year of normal operations, while in relation to 
the others 125 non-defaulting units, such as the 
residual 80%, we utilized a single year balance sheet 
data selected on the defaulting firms temporal 
distribution. 
As in the previous section, the decision was taken to 
calibrate the width of the training set to 70%, for a 
total of 109 firms of which 21 had failed, and the test 
set to 30%, for a total of 47 units of which 10 had 
failed. 
The overall prediction error obtained from this 
procedure was less than that of the “50-50 sample” 
implementation, and equal to 21.3% (40% type I 
error and 16.2% type II error). 
Despite this improvement in the overall 
performance, there was no change, however, in the 
incidence of type I error; to reduce it, it is probably 
necessary to consider choosing new explanatory 
variables of the default probability. 
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Table 2. Test set classification results: “80-20 
sample” 
 
 Predicted Group  
Actual Group non-
defaulting 
defaulting Total 
non-defaulting 31 6 37 
defaulting 4 6 10 
non-defaulting 83.8 16.2 100.0 
defaulting 40.0 60.0 100.0 
Overall classification error: 21.3% 
 
 
Building and selecting new explicative variables 
and testing the “80-20 sample” 
 
As the previous results had been disappointing, the 
decision was made to proceed by testing the 
possibility of specifying new explicative variables 
for the bankruptcy of a firm, following a different 
path from Altman. As there was no alternative 
theoretical reference model in the literature which 
had been unanimously agreed and then 
implemented, on the basis of the information at our 
disposal 70 balance sheet indicators were drawn up 
and subdivided into indices of financial structure and 
asset solidity, liquidity, profitability, financial 
management and extraordinary management. 
Of these indicators, 38 were selected: first of all in 
an attempt to favor those which could be normalized 
in order not to alter the effective weight of single 
pieces of information later, when the data were 
processed; in the second place, indices were 
excluded if they appeared to be clearly 
multicollinear. 
As the indices are built on accounting data, they can 
take on values which are less than zero if the income 
quantities used in their structure are negative; for 
this reason, after normalization, indices can take on 
values between -1 and 1. 
Building and then selecting explicative variables of 
the default probability we refer to the “80-20 
sample” because of its best theoretical and empirical 
performance, as described in previous section. 
Once normalization had been carried out, in order to 
avoid problems related to multicollinearity in later 
calculations, a correlation analysis was carried out25; 
from the 38 starting indicators we then arrived at 24. 
Performing multiple linear regressions an attempt 
was made to enucleate the factors which were able 
to influence the critical aspects of business 
management correlated to the probability of default, 
both analyzing and testing the coherence of the 
empirical evidence with the theoretical expectations 
relative to the causal direction (parameter is sign) of 
each explanatory variable which was held to be 
econometrically significative26. 
Only three variables resulted significative and 
associated to a sign which was coherent with the 
theory: 
 
- ROI = Operating profit / Total Assets 
- Lv = Net worth / (Net worth + Funded Debt) 
- CPN = Registered Capital / Net worth. 
 
For the purposes of discriminant analysis, the width 
of the training set was calibrated once again to 70% 
and that of the test set to 30%. 
The overall prediction error obtained was 12.8% 
(40% type I error and 5.4% type II error). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 To this end, statistical software PASW Statistics 18, generally 
known as SPSS, has been used. 
26 The econometric tests carried out, including those for assessing any 
possibility of an incorrect model specification due to the omission of 
relevant variables, including the particular case of an incorrect use of 
the functional form, mean that the results obtained can be judged 
reliable. 
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Table 3. Test set classification results:  
“80-20 sample” with new explanatory variables 
 
 Predicted Group  
Actual Group non- 
defaulting 
defaulting Total 
non- defaulting 35 2 37 
defaulting 4 6 10 
non- defaulting 94.6 5.4 100.0 
defaulting 40.0 60.0 100.0 
Overall classification error: 12.8% 
 
 
For further confirmation of the results obtained, we 
proceeded to construct another two different 
allocations of firms in the training and test sets and 
obtained results which were not significantly 
different. 
Despite the improvement in the overall performance, 
once again, the high incidence of type I error is 
unchanged. At this point, it became necessary to use 
a procedure of a different nature. 
 
 
The new model and the panel estimation 
 
Starting from the same 38 indicators previously 
selected, in order to avoid multicollinearity problems 
in later calculations, a correlation analysis was 
carried out using the information from a panel data, 
in the temporal window between 1994 and 2007. 
This was obviously a non-balanced panel data due to 
the progressive exit of defaulting firms, and to fill 
the information gaps which gradually began to 
appear in relation to these firms, the values relating 
to the last available year before failure were 
repeated, as is usual practice27. 
As a result of this procedure, 23 variables were 
pinpointed which were substantially the same as 
                                                 
27 Stock et al. (2008). 
those of the final selection described in the previous 
section. 
By means of fixed effects panel linear regressions, 
an attempt was made both to enucleate progressively 
the factors which can influence the critical aspects of 
business management most likely to be more 
correlated to probability of default and to analyze 
and test the coherence of the empirical evidence with 
theoretical expectations in relation to causal 
direction (parameter’s sign) of every explanatory 
variable held to be econometrically significant. 
As is widely-known, the fixed effects estimator 
concentrates on the data variation within every 
statistical unit (in this context, every firm under 
consideration) and is based entirely on time variation 
in data28. In our analysis, we used this type of 
estimator for a number of reasons. In the first place, 
the data available are a closed and complete set of 
information and the literature shows that in this case 
fixed effects are the natural candidates as they have 
the advantage of being able to capture effectively (or 
to test) all the relevant variables which are 
idiosyncratic with respect to statistical units which 
are fixed in time29. In the second place, our data 
show a good variation in the time dimension (14 
years) to be able to justify the use of a within 
estimator. Thirdly, the Least Squares with Dummy 
Variables (LSDV) estimation method, which is the 
procedure in the fixed effects context, is BLUE (i.e. 
the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) if  (i) the model 
is really of the type yit= a + b xit + Σ j=1, N-1 μ j Dji + 
εit, (ii) x is slightly exogenous and if εit ~IID (0, σ2ε) 
and  (iii) it is in any case consistent even though the 
true model is a random effects model. 
 
 
                                                 
28 On the opposing side, some estimators are available to analyze the 
spatial variation of data using separate regression on cross-sectional 
data (between estimator). The latter can be interpreted as a weighted 
average of cross-sectional estimation separately conducted. There is 
also a casual effect estimator which can capture data variations in both 
dimensions and it is a weighted average of within and between 
estimators (Baltagi, 2005). 
29 Baltagi, 2005. 
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Table 4. Results obtained from a fixed-effects 
estimator on panel data                 
Dependent variable: firm status 
 
 
Let x(J)it be the j-simo regressor in the model while 
yit represents the default probability associated to 
each statistical unit, such as yit = 1 if the firm is 
defaulted and yit = 0 if the firm is non-defaulted; 
then in our context of analysis the equation to 
estimate is the following: 
 
                                     
 it
j
itNj jit
xbay   
)(
,1
                                                                   
(1) 
 
where the error term is equal to a fixed effect plus a 
true idiosyncratic term εit= μi + wit.   
The fixed effect μi “absorbs” all the variables which 
are fixed in time and every other fixed time factor 
which may be relevant and which has not been 
considered explicitly.  
The following parameter values are obtained30: 
 
 
As can be seen, the variables are the same as those 
chosen in Section. 4.3. 
 
Our model therefore becomes 
 
y = 0.2290819 - 0.1010794 x(1) - 0.1261728 x(2) - 
0.4733249 x(3) 
 
where  x(1) = Lv,  x(2) = CPN  and  x(3) = ROI. 
 
In order to define the threshold level y0 which is 
necessary to distinguish non-defaulting from 
defaulting companies, we calculated for each of the 
fourteen years the averages of the values of Lv, CNP 
and ROI in relation to the firms which had a trading 
loss even if only for a single year. The choice was 
made to insert into the y function the lower value 
obtain within each of the three time series calculated 
in this way, in an averagely cautious perspective; in 
this way the values 0.46, 0.34 and -0.002 were 
pinpointed for the Lv, CPN and ROI variables 
respectively and we therefore arrived at a value of 
approximately 0.86 for the cut off. 
The prediction error obtained with this procedure is 
19.9% overall (32.2% type I error and 16.8% type II 
error), showing a type I error, the most worrying, 
which is noticeably more modest than that which is 
obtained using the same information from Altman’s 
original model, from Altman’s “80-20 sample” 
model and from the use of variables we selected in a 
discriminant analysis on this latter sample. 
An additional advantage of this procedure is the 
possibility of further reducing type I error, simply by 
reducing the threshold level, naturally keeping in 
mind the trade off between reducing type I error and 
                                                 
30 As we can note in Table 4, the fixed effects estimator gives the best 
results with respect to the random effect (as also confirmed by the 
Hausman test) or the OLS pooled estimator. 
 
Regressors Parameters 
(Standard Error) 
Lv -0.101079* (0.022) 
CPN -0.126173* (0.015) 
ROI -0.473325* (0.064) 
CONSTANT 0.2290819* (0.013) 
* = each parameter is 
significant to 5% with 
reference 
 to a bilateral test 
Number of observations = 
2184 
Number of groups = 156 
Observations for each group 
= 14 
R2 = 0.50 
Corr(ui xb) = 0.579 
F(3, 2025) = 110.72;  Prob>F 
= 0.000 
 
sigma_u = 0.1292448 
sigma_e = 0.17589481 
rho = 0.350061074 (fraction of 
the variance due to ui) 
Test F:all the  ui = 0; F(155, 
2025) = 7.52 ;  Prob > F = 0.000 
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increasing that of type II which can, in any case, be 
easily managed. 
Therefore, the banking management will define, 
starting from an objective threshold y0, by how 
much to reduce this value keeping in mind the level 
of risk aversion, the specific nature of the economic 
context in which the bank is operating and the 
intuition of its own managers as well as any binding 
regulations which might exist. 
 
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis: Type I and Type II 
errors varying from the cut off 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The use of the fixed effects panel regression on 
medium-large sized enterprises set from the Marche 
region allows a good assessment of bankruptcy risk 
in terms of type I and type II errors, with a suitable 
coefficient statistical significativity and a better 
assessment than that which can be obtained using 
Altman-style discriminant analysis or its variants. 
These results were obtained in stages. The first stage 
was a re-proposal of Altman’s discriminant analysis 
on our data set with modifications to the numerosity 
of the subsamples of non-defaulting and defaulting 
enterprises in relation to the population of firms 
analyzed. The second step saw the use of new 
variables and the relative coefficient estimations of 
the discriminant functions in the new space-time 
context. Finally, a fixed effect panel linear 
regression was carried out alongside the linear 
discriminant analysis from which the factors able to 
influence critical aspects of business management 
were progressively enucleated, using independent 
variables which are different from those in Altman’s 
models.  
In selecting these variables, their initial 
normalization, the level of multicollinearity shown, 
the degree of statistical significativity and coherence 
in terms of economic causality were all considered.  
It emerges from these results that 
 
 
 
 
 the explanatory variables in the probability of 
bankruptcy in our context of reference are the 
normalized values of leverage (Lv), defined as the 
ratio of net worth plus funded debt to net worth, of 
the index of asset solidity (CPN), expressed as the 
ratio of registered capital to net worth and of the 
index of return on investments (ROI), i.e. the ratio of 
operating profit to total assets; 
 the prediction error is 19.9% overall (32% type I 
error and 16.8% type II error). Type I error, the most 
worrying, is noticeably more modest that obtained 
by using the same information in Altman’s original 
model. 
 
In the method we have put forward, there is a level 
of arbitrariness relating to the preselected cut off 
cut off: 0.86 cut off: 0.90 
 Predicted Group   Predicted Group  
Actual Group non- 
defaulting 
defaulting Total Actual Group non- 
defaulting 
defaulting Total 
non- defaulting 104 21 125 non- defaulting 88 37 125 
defaulting 10 21 31 defaulting 8 23 31 
non- defaulting 83.2 16.8 100.0 non- defaulting 70.4 29.6 100.0 
defaulting 32.2 67.8 100.0 defaulting 25.8 74.2 100.0 
Overall classification error: 19.9% Overall classification error: 28.8% 
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level which arises from the average value of the 
explanatory variables deduced from enterprises 
whose balance sheets show a loss. This clearly 
shows an element of flexibility which permits us to 
insert operativeness margins into the bankruptcy risk 
assessment by means of a sensitivity analysis. 
An unfavorable situation is undoubtedly adequately 
addressed by the explicative variables suggested. 
The drop in ROI and, therefore consequently, the 
drop in net worth, dwindling reserves, increase the 
risk of the firm’s defaulting. Long-term debts, just 
like those of the short term variety, potentially 
offered by the banking systems or other sources of 
finance may be reduced so creating an increased 
estimated risk of the firm’s insolvency. On this 
issue, there is a further element which must be 
introduced into the analysis. This comes out of the 
reviewing of credit channels and the way they 
operate in financial crises31. In this context 
constraints on the various intermediaries in terms of 
their asset solidity, as it is possible to note in their 
balance sheets, emerge which are relevant for 
defining credit supply conditions32. In this 
perspective, a functional link can be established 
between the cut off level and the level of 
resilience/fragility of the banking system which 
may, in situations of difficulty, increase rigor in the 
assessment of credit merit. In terms of this model, 
this means implementing a management and 
organizational strategy which leads to the reduction 
of type I error while increasing type II error. The 
banking system’s change of strategy increases 
uncertainty for a greater number of enterprises with 
the potential consequence that it reduces the finance 
availability from outside the production system. 
Endogenizing the cut off level is an issue to be 
placed on the agenda of the current research project 
parallel to lengthening the time factor in this panel 
data. This will allow us to move on to further testing 
of the model and to achieve a better out of the 
sample calibration. 
                                                 
31 Bank for International Settlements, 2010. 
32 Del Giovane et al., 2010. 
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